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ABSTRACT 
Although innovation management has been extensively studied over the past decades, 
current literature hardly screens the current challenge for large project-based firms. For 
these firms, innovation management no longer deals with launching breakthrough 
products, but more likely with integrating innovative value propositions within a regular 
stream of platforms. This paper provides an analytical framework to understand this new 
form of challenge. We applied this framework to analyze four cases of innovation routes 
at two different OEMs. The article specifies the process of the innovation route and 
identifies key moments that stand as manageable turning points and variables. 
INTRODUCTION 
Time-paced competition led companies to put in place rationalized design organizations 
that guarantee a constant stream of new products. As a consequence, the challenge of 
innovation management stands as the pattern of making the stream of products evolve in 
a value-creating way. In this perspective, the evolution of product lines is a balanced 
game between regular platforms of products based on incrementally evolving knowledge, 
and a constellation of value propositions that challenge the dominant design of the 
product lines and the core competencies of the organization. 
Companies adopt different strategies regarding this features/products game. In the 
automotive industry, Toyota dedicated a new line of products to a value proposition 
(hybrid engine) and then to deploy this value proposition on regular product lines. In the 
software industry, Microsoft makes its software platforms evolve by versioning different 
packages of features. Facing this renewed competitive landscape, we are still at the early 
stages of definition of a satisfying theoretical framework that can highlight the key 
challenges and provide decision making canvas for such innovation management issues. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an analytical framework that can address the 
main rules of the features – products interplay. To tackle this issue, we chose to study 
several value propositions’ routes across several generations of products, and to analyze 
their evolution. The goal is to highlight key moments and mechanisms paving the route 
that goes from a brilliant idea of value to a proven and profitable innovation, deployed on 
several ranges of platforms, and part of the core competencies of the firm. 
In the first part we base on the product development literature to delimitate the new 
challenges for innovation management in large project-oriented firms. We then settle the 
innovation route framework and explain how we use it as an analytical artefact to track 
innovative features across products. In the following part we review four cases of 
innovation routes: ACCESS and CROSS at two different global automotive OEMs. We 
finally underline the major findings of this experimental implementation of the analytical 
grid both from an academic and managerial view. 
FROM PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT TO INNOVATION MANAGEMENT 
The empowerment and routinization of development activities 
In the 80s, the increasing competitive pressure put emphasise on the ability of industrial 
firms to improve the quality level, to lower the cost, to increase the pace of products 
launches, and, last but not least, to manage the increasing complexity of several kinds of 
products. This shift was addressed to numerous industries: automotive, medical devices, 
consumer goods, electronics, computers... A lot of attention has been paid by 
practitioners and researchers on the way manufacturers could meet this challenge, mainly 
by studying the Japanese firms (Imai and al. 1985). Pioneer researches defined concepts 
and organizational frameworks for effective product development: heavyweight project 
management teams, concurrent engineering and early supplier involvement (Clark and al. 
1987; Clark and Fujimoto 1991; Midler 1993; Midler 1995). These frameworks and 
methodologies spread rapidly among industrial firms along the 90s. 
The “fat-design” problem is a collateral effect of this overwhelming success (Fujimoto 
1999). The focus on the cost-quality-timeline (CQT) indicators of a single product tends 
to prefer one-shot solutions that favoured the project disregarding the firm global 
performance. Platform strategies aim at promoting a global parts approach, by sharing 
components and subsystems among different products (Cusumano and Nobeoka 1998; 
Meyer and Lehnerd 1997). The platform approach maximizes the commonality of 
components among several projects and reduces the coordination burden between 
projects and functional departments. The platform approach manages diversity among the 
different products in order to save costs and improve lead-time. 
Given the pressure on development performance, it is more and more difficult for firms 
to take risks in the context of development routines (Aggeri and Segrestin 2007). 
Moisdon & Weil (1998) thus show that the pressure upon project managers leads them to 
consider innovation as a potential danger with regards to cost, quality and delivery time. 
This leads to “frontload” all the problems to the pre-project phase (the "front-end" of the 
project). As a consequence, the pre-project phase was increasingly considered both as a 
product definition process (Smith & Reinertsen’s 1991; Ulrich and Eppinger 2003) but 
also as a risk-elimination process aimed at reducing the problem-solving effort of the 
development phase (Ciavaldini 1996; Cooper and Kleinschmidt 1996; Gerwin and 
Barrowman 2002; Thomke and Fujimoto 2000). 
Innovation management in the projectified firm 
Firms are now well armed to develop rapidly new products, and to lead a global parts 
strategy in order to manage the diversity implied by this evolution. But new product 
development did not explicitly refer to innovation management (Brown and Eisenhardt 
1995). Researchers paid a lot of attention on the CQT factors, partly because innovation 
has been regarded as a micro-economical event. For several years, this shaping of the 
innovation topic is balanced by numerous researches in marketing, organization, and 
operations and management sciences. They take for common basis that the CQT criteria 
are only a part of the product attractiveness. Innovation management implies to complete 
the CQT criteria by questioning the firm’s capability to embed within the stream of 
products enough customer value to provide product and brand attractiveness. 
Building such value propositions appear to be a major challenge for project-based 
firms, whose organization clearly mirrors the traditional knowledge base of the firm 
(market and technical). This setting is likely to be reluctant to integrate value propositions 
that are disruptive towards this organizational structure (Galunic and Eisenhardt 2001; 
Henderson and Clark 1990). The projectified organizations (Midler 1995) instituted core 
capabilities that maximize the CQT indicators. The core capabilities developed in NPD 
tend to turn into core rigidities that model potential products through a stable architecture 
(Leonard-Barton 1992). 
Innovation as an interplay between knowledge and development activities 
As the development activities became empowered and autonomous, innovation 
management has been increasingly considered as a matter of interplay between the 
empowered development activities and knowledge activities. Several researches 
highlighted specific mechanisms of this interplay. 
Iansiti’s work (1998) permits to better understand the linkage between technological 
knowledge activities and product development activities. He shows that development 
projects that “create a match between technological options and application context” 
(p.21) perform better than others. In other words, knowledge creation should be oriented 
through the future context of integration. If Iansiti’s work permits to better understand the 
integration of a technology within a product under development, his work focuses on the 
technical improvement of well 
defined value propositions, and 
leaves aside deeper reshuffling of 
the product hierarchy. Furthermore, 
the multi-product deployment of 
the technology remains at the 
background of his work. 
Cusumano & Selby (1995) 
describe the products / features 
interplay at Microsoft as a “sync-
and-synchronize” process. The 
development teams build an 
increasingly reliable product by 
testing the integration of the different features at a day-to-day basis. Features remain 
relatively independent so they can change along the project from more than 30% 
depending on updated knowledge. On the same way as Iansiti, since the authors focus on 
product performance, they do not really question the deployment and capitalization issue. 
Marsh and Stock settle a model of “intertemporal integration” that address this multi-
products issue (Marsh and Stock 2003). By modelling the product learning cycle they aim 
at identifying key mechanisms of dynamic capabilities in the interplay between 
development activities and knowledge activities. This framework looks promising, but 
remains at an emerging phase and still misses some empirical insights. 
FRAMEWORK & METHODOLOGY 
Figure 1 - The Interplay among Products Lines and Innovative Value 
Propositions 
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This paper completes and enlarges the existing literature by providing a framework that 
can address the trajectory of an innovative feature across products. This framework is 
used to analyze empirical data on innovative features that are not only technological 
components, but more radical features that question both the regular architecture of the 
product, and the regular customer value. 
Defining a value proposition and its evolution 
We define an innovative feature as a technical solution aimed at providing a 
supplement of customer value that is not included in the definition of the traditional 
products. A value proposition tends to present a set of valuable functionalities (1) that 
match with the specific embedment constraints of several products contexts (2). This 
solution should be technically reliable - product and process (3) and bring with it a 
recognized advantage for the firm (4). We thus characterize a value proposition through 
the four following ranked criteria. 
 Level 1 Level 5 
1. Customer 
Value 
Basic idea expected to increase the 
customer value 
Proven strong customer value associated with 
a product/service. 
2. 
Integrability 
Context related constraints are not taken 
into account by the feature. 
Multi-product integrability – A generative 
model to deploy it on a range of products. 
3. Maturity  Underlying technology is unclear, no 
system test, no process. 
Underlying bodies of knowledge are explicitly 
known. 
4. Profit Fuzzy assessment on profitability for the 
firm. 
Defined business model, positive margin, 
recognized benefit. 
Table 1 - Ranking of a value proposition on the four criteria 
Framing the products/features interplay: the innovation route 
We distinguish between knowledge related activities and development related activities. 
Development activities are defined as the set of investigations aimed at renewing existing 
lines of products based on firm’s core capability. These activities encompass the 
investigations focused on CQT criteria and kaizen improvement of the products. We 
define the knowledge activities as the set of investigations aimed at exploring innovative 
value propositions, preparing them for the embedment in specific contexts, and 
capitalizing the related knowledge in the regular product-process organization. 
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Figure 2 - The Innovation Route model of an innovative feature across products 
We finally define four phases in the route of an innovative feature. These phases are 
delimited by the targeted contexts and by the nature of the investigations. The exploration 
phase consists in exploring and preparing an innovative feature for upcoming 
development projects. The contextualization phase consists in preparing a specific 
proposal to embed the feature within an ongoing pre-project. As soon as the non-return 
point is passed, the development phase consists in effectively developing the feature 
within the product development process. Once the first feature is marketed, the 
deployment phase consists in capitalizing on this first experience to deploy the feature on 
a coherent range of products. This framework will be used to analyze empirical data 
following a cross-cases methodology. 
Methodology 
We aim at better understanding the process and organizational setting that support the 
emergence, integration and deployment of value propositions. We are thus looking for a 
process theory (Mohr 1982) that includes several development and knowledge-based 
activities. Therefore, we chose to shift our analytical lenses from a product to a value 
proposition that is to be deployed on a broad range of products. 
Trying to formalize emerging practices in companies, we relied on multiple exploratory 
case studies (Yin 2003) which provide empirical insights of the above-described ill-
structured process. The two cases ACCESS and CROSS at OEM A were used to generate 
the initial framework. The same cases at OEM B were added to the sample as theoretical 
replications and extensions to challenge and refine the framework (Leonard-Barton 1990; 
Yin 2003). 
We aim at characterizing the route of the 4 features from their early beginnings to their 
multi-product deployment. On each case, we tracked back the 4 above described criteria 
in order to identify the main shifts. This tracking process permitted to identify key 
milestones of the route, and to characterize the corresponding management challenges. 
Data collection 
We chose to investigate the automotive industry. Although it was a privileged source of 
learning on project management, it has been relatively neglected as a research field for 
innovation management. The choice of this industry was also guided by the opportunity 
we had to collect rich data. Top Management from two global automotive manufacturers 
promoted the study through financial support and time consuming involvement. 
The two cases ACCESS and CROSS were selected in order to cover a contrasted scope 
of value propositions. The ACCESS feature is a keyless system which is very innovative 
towards customer use (new set of functionalities). The CROSS value proposition is a 
compact cockpit module which stands as an integrated system putting into question the 
traditional architecture of the dashboard perimeter. 
On each case, we had access to key managers and in-house documentation of car 
manufacturers and tier-1 suppliers that were involved in the innovation process. We 
conducted 42 interviews of diverse manager’s profiles (project, research, purchasing, 
technical…) that were involved in the management of the features. 
TRACKING THE ROUTES OF 4 VALUE PROPOSITIONS 
Case ACCESS at OEM A 
VP Preparation - In the 80s, the OEM A’s Exterior Equipment Department and their 
supplier’s counterparts had lived an exciting period: in less than ten years they passed 
from mechanical key controlled locks to electrical radio-controlled centralized locking 
system. Both OEM and suppliers thought they can do more, and studied how they could 
make this opening system fully automatic. In the early 90s, no one showed enough 
interest in the topic to continue such efforts in the Technical Departments. The topic 
remained active from 1992 to 1994 at the OEM’s Research Centre, which was 
responsible to make a first draft of an ACCESS system. It finally delivered a patented 
functioning scheme mainly based on electronic specifications. 
VP Contextualization - In June 1996, a Development Program suddenly broadcasted its 
need to include in the definition of the product several value propositions that could make 
a difference for the customer. In order to abide by the constraints of the product (parts 
layout, market segment, selling price…), the Vehicle Program Manager merged the pilot 
in-house studies and the studies of consulted suppliers, and finally proposed to the Board 
a mixed version of ACCESS. 
VP Development - In December 1997, the Board decided that ACCESS should be 
included as original equipment. Another important decision was to nominate an 
Innovation Project Manager who was responsible to coordinate the two main contracted 
suppliers and the development teams impacted by the system (12 out of 26). What he put 
in place was an actual “development project within the development program”, since he 
created ad hoc validation patterns and contractual engagements among people that were 
already contracted within the vehicle project. The ACCESS project involved numerous 
surprises caused by vehicle embedment, or related with customer functional mis-
anticipations. The system was finally right on-time for vehicle market launch. 
VP Deployment - The first version of ACCESS did not fully meet the initial Marketing 
Department demand. Indeed the technical incertitude took the lead and lowered the 
functional ambition. The Program Manager decided not only to deploy the feature on the 
two upcoming models, but also to enrich the functionalities in order to meet the initial 
customer value. Today, the ACCESS system includes all the initially wished 
functionalities, and is deployed on 8 models from 3 platforms. ACCESS is placed under 
the responsibility of a joint electronic – mechanic team, which was recently co-located. 
Case ACCESS at OEM B 
VP Preparation - In the early 80s, the Mechanical Division wondered how it could 
benefit from the generalization of electric power in cars. It launched a two year study 
focus on the electrification of the steering column lock. At the same time, the Exterior 
Equipment Division triggered a parallel study aimed at making the door locking and 
unlocking procedure automatic. At the end of the day, both studies were unable to show 
enough benefit to justify more resources, even if the auto-lock project finally sold a pilot 
feature as optional equipment on a luxury car. 
VP Contextualization – The topic got silent until 1995, when the Board voted a 
customer value based strategy, which implied to add attractive features to upcoming 
vehicles. The dedicated steering committee nominated a taskforce responsible for 
introducing the ACCESS feature on the market. The members of this taskforce were the 
former pilots of the 2 above described studies, who had reached heavyweight positions in 
their respective Departments. They rapidly merged their experience to propose a coherent 
ACCESS system. They initially targeted the directly upcoming car project, which was a 
luxury one. After 6 months of study, they realized that no solution could match the cost 
and functional expectations. Taking advantage from this initial study, they targeted 
another upcoming vehicle project - a low end urban car – and managed to build a 
scenario that met the cost (scale effect), technical functional requirements. This was the 
kick-off of the ACCESS project within the traditional vehicle project. 
VP Development - The early collaboration engaged among the different technical 
departments was identified as dramatic for the development of the ACCESS system, at 
least at two levels. First, this system spread among more than ten regular car perimeters, 
and required a tight coordination among project teams. Secondly, they had to agree on the 
specific requirements of the ACCESS feature, which had sometimes to take the lead in 
front of institutionalized vehicle validation procedures. The OEM finally launched the car 
on time, and widely based the marketing plan on the promotion of the ACCESS system 
(TV ads, show-cars). The car sales and ACCESS equipment rate reached the previsions, 
and allowed meeting the economic balance. 
VP Deployment - Based on this successful experience, the OEM decided to deploy the 
feature on other from other platforms. The ACCESS topic has been promoted by the 
same steering committee as at the beginning of the story, which supported its 
development within more than a dozen of different vehicles in 5 years. They triggered 
ACCESS-focused cross-functional investigations that clearly stand out of the regular 
scope of vehicle-focused cross-functional investigations. By doing so, they were able to 
guarantee a persuasive balance between the customer value and the pattern of associated 
costs. In order to enhance the customer value, it demanded to refine functionalities in 
seek for the best fit with the market segment specificities. 
Case CROSS at OEM A 
VP Preparation – During the 1990s, the Technical Department in charge of the cockpit 
had great troubles in preparing innovative solutions within such an integrated perimeter. 
The technical teams conducted several advanced studies in order to improve the 
performance of their parts, but once the time to develop a vehicle came, these advanced 
studies did not match together in a coherent manner. That’s why the traditional parts 
layout survived despite the increasing importance of the “life-on-board” concept. In 
2002, the Director of the Inner Design Engineering tried to bridge this paradox by 
triggering a new form of advanced study. He requested several suppliers to investigate an 
integrated cockpit solution in the context of a real ongoing vehicle program. 
VP Contextualization – Several suppliers had already investigated the theme. Their 
proposals were promising, and the OEM decided to make them compete on the real 
vehicle architecture. The OEM firstly indicated a niche vehicle that would be produced 
by 2010. Suppliers’ proposals fitted relatively well with the specific constraints of this 
product, since product-process constraints were quite loose in that scale of production. 
After 6 months of interaction with the suppliers, the technical teams responsible for the 
investigations realized that they would only trigger the required in-house commitment by 
targeting a current platform program. In January 2004, suppliers were asked to prepare 
for direct interplay with the development teams of a mass selling car which start of 
production was programmed for 2008. 
The context was evolving on a week-to-week basis, and suppliers had to keep their 
proposals fitted to this evolving layout. The interlocutors of the suppliers were the regular 
product-process technical teams of the pre-development project. Each team was 
evaluated on traditional kaizen performance targets. The suppliers were de facto asked to 
satisfy not only the global target of compactness, but also the local targets of performance 
on each part of the module. Six months after the beginning of this experiment, and even if 
their initial proposals were promising (technically validated, economically feasible…) 
none of them passed through the final decision. Each solution did lost appeal by adapting 
to vehicle related constraints (changes in the manufacturing process, need of new 
components that took more space…). 
VP Deployment - Most surprising were the reactions of the involved teams: despite both 
suppliers and OEM had spent resources to develop a solution that was finally not 
developed or sold; all of them claimed to have benefited from the experience. The OEM 
benefited from this experience by promoting the CROSS topic within in-house top-tech 
meetings. This experience triggered technical studies focused on questions and value axis 
that have emerged at this occasion, both at the OEM and at the suppliers. 
Case CROSS at OEM B 
VP Exploration - The research department of OEM B officially considered the interior 
volume as a valuable innovation domain from the year 2000. In 2001, the research centre 
allocated resources to a study focused on cockpit module compactness. 
The dedicated research team first considered a way to measure the compactness of a 
cockpit. It defined rough variables of performance and targets to reach. These targets 
included the traditional conditions of maturity of the different parts composing the 
cockpit module, and also specific targets of volume and broad architectural orientations. 
After having validated these elements with the Research Committee, it requested from a 
parts’ supplier to tackle the issue. From 2003 to 2004, the OEM’s and the supplier’s 
research team interacted at a month-to-month basis, reviewing the results of this study. 
VP Contextualization - After a 12-month period of broad technical feasibility testing 
and performance criteria refinement, the cooperation shifted to a more contextualized 
investigation. The OEM gave more precise elements of context, defining a targeted range 
of vehicle, and several elements of architectural context based on an existing vehicle 
model that had to be replaced in the next decade. From 2005 to 2006 the supplier had to 
reach a certain volume target abiding by the previously acquired technical validations.  
In July 2006, even if the results of these investigations were promising in term of 
habitability and cockpit compactness, there was still no guarantee that the targeted 
development project would be favourable to embed this solution, or that the architectural 
decisions towards the architecture of this product will fit with the hypothesis made during 
this investigation. 
RESULTS & IMPLICATIONS 
The experimental implementation of the innovation route grid makes visible dramatic 
mechanisms of the process that allow a brilliant idea of feature to be deployed on a range 
of products. We regarded the features’ related sequence of events as a cumulative process 
aiming at this target. We observe that the route of a value proposition reveals important 
Scheme 3 - “CROSS A” indicators before and after 
contextualization (source: our research) 
 
variations both in the 4 indicators under evaluation and in the organizational settings that 
support this evolution. 
The forms of early explorations 
The exploration phase appears as dramatic and particularly difficult to manage. 
Whereas it is common language for development projects to call for “proven 
technologies”, the cases show that there is an unavoidable space between what the 
development projects are likely to embed directly, and what the research activities are 
able to deliver even with consequent resources. On the four cases, no value proposition 
could be embedded without demanding tremendous further investigations. On the 
ACCESS A case, even two years of investigations on the keyless entry topic were not 
sufficient to provide a functioning system. 
The case provide evidence that the organization of exploration activities (following 
technical domains of expertise) and advanced activities (following regular product 
architecture) act as a major canvas for feature preparation. The ACCESS A research team 
was specialized in electronics, and disregarded industrialization constraints or functional 
requirements. We can also observe this phenomenon when the investigations are led by 
technical product-process departments: the compactness had been studied by different 
product-process departments in the past, unsuccessfully. The upfront organization orients 
the early studies towards mono-expertise roadmaps instead of an integrated effort pulled 
by the seeking for customer value. On the same way, CROSS shows the difficulty to 
study and develop an architectural value proposition within the regular development 
organization. Advanced studies were led by different technical departments which failed 
to coordinate on a valuable parts’ setting. 
The limits of “off-the-shelves” solutions 
The second main insight provided here follows Iansiti’s conclusions and directly 
questions the notion of “proven technology”: the exploratory investigations are context 
dependant. What has been validated out of context can be put into question just by 
modifying a tight element of the value proposition. On each case, the sudden appearance 
of specific context related constraints interrogated several hypotheses that have been 
guiding the investigations so far. 
On the CROSS A case, the suppliers made early investigations based on a generic 
context of embedment that fitted relatively well with a specific niche product. As the 
targeted product changed, numerous interferences appeared. The adaptation process 
(scheme 3) putted into question the 
previously envisaged technical solutions 
(maturity 3->1), the economic balance 
because the new technical solutions were 
much more expensive (profit 2->1). The 
customer value of the cockpit module 
was also questioned (3->1) since the new 
layout demanded volume consuming 
parts in order to keep abiding by the 
regular specifications. 
The innovative solution is “shelved”, “validated” or “proven” in a given functional / 
technical configuration that is very dependent on the context of embedment. So we can 
only underline the critical role of the embedment process. The two CROSS cases provide 
insights from two different choices of contextualization process. Let us have a closer look 
at the positive and negative aspects of these two settings. 
Various track of value proposition contextualization 
Whereas OEM A envisaged the embedment process of the CROSS solution within the 
product development process, OEM B chose to investigate the embedment out of the 
product development cycle. The table 2 shows a brief synthesis of the characteristics of 
these two processes. 
 CROSS A CROSS B 
Major 
advantages 
The proximity to the product 
sales provides great incentives for 
OEM and suppliers 
Step-by-step investigations that 
account a progressively 
representative context. 
Major 
disadvantages 
VP product and process 
validations are placed under the 
same validation regimes than 
robust traditional parts 
Uncertainty towards the context 
hypothesis and the upcoming 
valorisation 
Table 2 - Advantages and disadvantages observed of both patterns of contextualization 
One could imagine a hybrid form of embedment between these two specific settings. 
We currently carry out further research in order to define the settings of a 
contextualization process that could maximize namely the context matching, the 
maturation pace and the incentive effect. 
Shaping the innovation routes 
We cannot understand the decisions made during case if we limit our scope of 
evaluation to the performance of the current development project. CROSS was not 
developed yet but the CROSS’s route benefited from the created knowledge for both 
OEM and suppliers. Several decisions aim not only at increasing the value of the 
upcoming product, but also to nurture and solidify value proposition related knowledge 
fields (Hatchuel and al. 2004) in order to make the future features embedment more 
likely and profitable (Lenfle and Midler 2001). 
In this “rebound” perspective, the cases provide evidence that firms can choose 
different patterns of learning. These are summarized in Figure 4. OEM A privileged a 
more customer-value-oriented innovation route. In spite of poor exploratory technical 
studies, it defined quite rapidly valuable functionalities and brought the feature on the 
market through a mass selling product. This shift triggered an incentive to learn the 
missing technical knowledge. The OEM B led a more iterative and technical-oriented 
innovation route that used several development projects as learning support. The 
successive trials led to define a relevant set of functionalities and a profitable feature. 
The ACCESS case shows extensively how innovative value propositions need different 
coordination process than the product development routines: they tend to fade the 
coherence of the innovative value proposition behind the regular validation patterns. At 
OEM A the lead came from the project management, and needed heavyweight 
management in order to coordinate the technical teams that were not strongly committed. 
After the first development, the technical departments formalized written design rules and 
dedicated a technical team. At OEM B, the lead came from technical departments that 
had already worked together on the topic. They acted as heavyweight coordinators for in-
house technical teams and suppliers. These roles are still unchanged today. 
The multi-products learning perspective enables to regard the improvement of the four 
criteria on the scale of different products. The cases highlight the need to consider the 
four criteria at a multi-products scale. Project-oriented organizations (like OEM A) tend 
to focus on the cost related to the first embedment and disregard the consequences of 
these early choices towards upcoming embedment efforts. We face here another fat-
design problem: a decision could be rationally justified at the level of project 
performance, but could represent an over-design cost when considering the integration 
problem at a multi-context scale. 
Further researches 
The multi-case approach we adopted here was relevant to build accurate analytical 
lenses but we still miss a more systematic approach to isolate key levers for the 
management of this kind of innovation routes. We currently define a quantitative 
approach to correlate management practices of the innovation routes with differences in 
the performance of these routes. This framework will be part of the first round of an 
international benchmark on innovation of the International Motor Vehicle Program. 
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